Around The Web: Moving Day

I wish almost every good thing ESPN wrote wasn't behind a pay wall. At least Jon Weisman from Dodgers Thoughts won't be, as he moves from the Los Angeles Times to ESPN. I'm not exactly sure why he's moving again, maybe he got a better deal from ESPN, but I think the Times is losing a lot here. Unless Jon links to them, they're likely losing my daily visits, and I imagine many others. On the plus side, I think I am officially his underling now. In addition to being a writer to his editor for the annual, I am now a network blogger to his official blogger. Hooray for me? :o

ESPN: Matthew Carruth says that pinch hitting isn't always the best idea.

In 2009, major league pinch-hitters hit a combined .225/.315/.353, significantly worse than their starting counterparts, who hit .264/.334/.421. That's not a one-year fluke or a recent development, either. In 1990, guys coming off the bench hit .224/.302/.316. In 1970, they hit .226/.313/.323. Way back in 1954, their performance was a pitiful .220/.315/.323. It's not just that the average pinch-hitter is worse than a starter, but instead, there is evidence that pinch-hitting is just really difficult.

Baseball consultant Tom Tango, now in the employ of the Seattle Mariners and Toronto Blue Jays, went through historical pinch-hitting situations in his book (appropriately titled "The Book") and found that, even after accounting for the average pinch-hitter being of lesser ability and facing tougher pitchers in more important situations, pinch-hitters performed at a level roughly 10 percent lower than expected. That's huge; a 10 percent penalty turns a .300 hitter into a .270 one. That reduction in performance would turn Evan Longoria into Skip Schumaker.

What makes pinch-hitting so hard? Repetition and routine are common agents to help calm nerves. It's why you'll see some ridiculous things in the batter's box, such as Nomar Garciaparra's infamous batting glove routine. It's why coaches in golf stress pre-shot routines, and for every disturbance to mean a complete do-over of that routine. It's why any athlete anywhere spends countless hours practicing. They are attempting to train their muscle memory and to develop grooves in the brain that focus on the specific task at hand and let them forget about anything else.

Pinch-hitting is one of the most difficult things to do well in all of sports. Even good hitters fail routinely when asked to come off the bench and get a big hit late in the game. It isn't as simple as comparing the batting averages of the two available options and going with the higher number. While inaction is always tougher to watch -- and easier to criticize -- it is often for the best. Pinch-hitting for the pitcher? Good idea. Pinch-hitting for your starting shortstop? You'd better have a legitimately good hitter available, and it still might not be the right call.

I think those of us who are into sabermetric stuff already knew this, mainly because we were already familiar with Tom Tango's work. However, I think it's extremely cool that it's now on ESPN for the general public to see. Furthermore, I think Matt did a great job writing it in a way that makes it easier to understand for the general public, and almost impossible to refute.

ESPN: Tommy Bennett tries to explain why a high stolen base efficiency doesn't mean a player should attempt to steal more.

Last year, Chase Utley of the Philadelphia Phillies stole 23 bases; it was a career high for the All-Star.

More remarkable? Utley was not caught stealing once all season. A perfect season on the basepaths is a rare accomplishment, but it practically begs the question: "Why didn't Utley try to steal more bases?"

By analogy, Utley should attempt to steal bases until the extra chance of winning is outweighed by the decreased chance of winning in the event he is caught. If Utley attempted to steal in any situation with a less favorable chance of success, he would be hurting his team because the marginal costs would outweigh the marginal benefits.

That exact break-even point is going to depend on variables that change from game to game and inning to inning. But let's assume that Utley, a smart baserunner with a great first-base coach, has found that point. Because each situation that's easier than the point at which Utley should stay put was by definition easier, Utley's average success rate would be quite high, much higher than the 70 percent success rate needed to break even. If he were to keep attempting stolen bases until his average season rate matched the 70 percent point, he'd have been stealing in situations where he was hurting his team's chances of winning.

If the Phillies, Lopes and manager Charlie Manuel consider analysis at the margins, Utley might not run more at all next season. And there is ample evidence that the Phillies do understand this analysis. Last year, the Phillies had four players steal at least 20 bases, and none of them was less than 75 percent successful. During Lopes' first season in Philadelphia in 2007, the team set the record for stolen base percentage at 87.9. In each of the subsequent years, the Phillies have led the league in the category. With Utley and Lopes, the perfect is not necessarily the enemy of the good.

I think this one might have been a bit confusing for the average fan, but it's still a good read. Honestly, I think I would just explain that if Utley attempted to steal 10 more times, but the cost of those attempts was getting caught 5 times due to them being in less favorable conditions, then he's hurting his team more than he's helping. Not the most mathematically sound analogy, but I think people can ground with that.

ESPN: David Schoenfield defends the competitive balance in baseball.

The resulting conclusion, offered up by pundits, columnists, bloggers, radio hosts and fans: The NFL has competitive balance; Major League Baseball does not.

But here's some shocking news: These experts are wrong. The NFL does not have better competitive balance than baseball.

If you can handle the truth, I'll explain why.

Let's begin with some pairs of factoids for the decade, from the MLB and NFL seasons from 2000 to 2009.

Number of World Series champions: 8
Number of Super Bowl champions: 6 (7 if the Saints win)

Number of teams to reach the World Series: 14
Number of teams to reach the Super Bowl: 15

Number of teams to reach the league championship series: 21
Number of teams to reach a conference title game: 21

Number of teams not to make MLB playoffs: 7
Number of teams not to make NFL playoffs: 3

Baseball has more champions, nearly half of its 30 teams have reached the World Series, and more than two-thirds have played in a league championship series. The NFL totals are clearly similar.

If you focus on the last pair of totals, keep in mind that 12 teams (out of 32) make the NFL playoffs, as opposed to eight (out of 30) in baseball, so it's easier to make the postseason in the NFL. The NFL has five teams that didn't make the final eight.

I'm not arguing that baseball's system is perfect or that the Pirates operate under the same constraints as the Yankees. I'm not arguing that baseball doesn't have problems that need to be addressed. I am arguing that there is no evidence that the NFL's salary cap system creates more competitive balance.

Yes, the sticking point here is "fairness." But fairness is a slippery slope. Is it fair that the Colts can pay Peyton Manning far below his true market value and thus dominate year after year? Is it fair that the Patriots can place a franchise tag on Vince Wilfork, thus ultimately limiting his ability to get a contract his abilities would demand?

Bottom line: Let's stop the analysis that doesn't jibe with the facts. The Detroit Lions are bad because of years of incompetent management. The Pittsburgh Pirates are bad because of years of incompetent management. Don't blame the system.

By the way, with a new labor agreement unlikely, the NFL is probably entering an uncapped year in 2010. The future? Who knows. Seems as though some NFL owners think it's unfair to share so much of their revenue with other franchises.

Couldn't have put it better myself.

ESPN: Great article by Seth Wickersham (always liked him) on Kurt Warner and his retirement. I'm a Rams fan, and Warner brought me many great moments and memories. I'm a fan for life.

Thanks for the access. Warner has been as open as any superstar player. He signs every autograph. He has time for every interview, even the tough ones. I remember talking to him in 2003 when I was doing a story about the quarterback who replaced him with the Rams, Marc Bulger.

Warner was his usual accommodating self, singing the praises of a rival who would turn out to be a fraction as good. When Warner sat behind Eli Manning and Matt Leinart, he just waited his turn.

It's easy to be a fan of an athlete simply because he's good, and Warner certainly was that, but it was his actions and words when he was down in the dumps that truly impacted me. It was the stuff that happened after he supposedly lost his magic touch that made me realize his good guy act really wasn't an act at all.

I remember when Marc Bulger was handed the starting job in St. Louis, and Warner accepted the change as graciously as a previous superstar possibly could (though his wife didn't do the same). Then, after a few Bulger struggles, the Rams considered going back to Warner, but he told the Rams brass that it would be unfair to the kid to have a QB controversy/carousel situation, and to stick with their original decision. Who does that nowadays? Truly amazing.

Warner did a similar thing with the Giants, when they wanted to install their franchise quarterback first round draft pick. A lot of fans falsely believe that Warner was replaced due to ineffectiveness, but in reality, Eli Manning didn't achieve a better QB rating than the one Warner posted with the Giants until 2009, five years after the fact.

Then in Arizona, despite losing the QB job to yet another first round franchise quarterback, he was continually gracious to Matt Leinart, encouraging him and supporting him. At least until the coaching staff could take no more and went with Warner to revive the franchise. And that he did.

All of this stuff wasn't some dog and pony show for the media either, as he rarely mentioned what he did or what he said in private, and most of this probably wouldn't be known unless other people spoke up on his behalf.

Skepticism is the prism I look through whenever cameras and public personas are involved, but Warner is one of the very few professional athletes where I would be truly floored if he turned out to be a fraud.

I'm quite sure we'll never see another quarterback like Kurt Warner, partially because of the amazing things he did on the field, but mostly because of his amazing attitude off it.